BUILDINGS versus BLAST
Some explosives attacks using buildings as the target in the period 1970 – 2005, UK only. 

 
It is estimated the “Irish Republican terror campaign attacks” have cost up to £100 billion.
 
The continued use of variously sized vehicle bombs and the growing use of personnel delivered bombs in attacks against buildings and their inhabitants highlights the need for an in depth review of how these and other potential target structures can be better protected by situation, design and construction from this form of terrorism. The threat and actuality of terrorist attacks will continue to grow and it should be accepted as one of the environmental challenges that planners, designers, engineers and architects face.

Natural Events

The building industry from concept to capitalisation has developed extensive systems to deal with natural disasters broughton by such events as high wind, earthquake, volcano eruption, floods and fires but not enough has been done in the field protection against the human hazard.

To some extent the location of naturally occurring catastrophic events can be predicted so we may have “the where” and “the when” through observation and careful monitoring. Their scale can also be calculated using historic events and a predictive system of some kind but even with these tools mankind is frequently caught under prepared.

Volcano giving a hint there is something happening.	Aftermath of an earthquake.	Flood on the Sub-continent. (Again).

Manmade Events

The terrorist does not fight his cause with the regimental flag flying from the back of his Landrover, he looks for the world media to keep his colours in the public’s focus, this is stimulated and achieved by continuously searching for soft spots in dramatic targets and attacking them. Most Governments have hardened their buildings over the years so the terrorist looks for other icons that, when attacked, will hold the front pages and the attention of the world’s readers, listeners and viewers.

With attacks using explosives there are physical rules and parameters that are completely predictable and calculable. The more explosive material the bigger the blast and the more damage it will do. The further from the target the device is, the less damage it will achieve. The technology and calculations exist for these circumstances but “the where” and “the when” are more difficult and one should start by assuming anywhere, anytime. The location and timing of an explosive attack is in the hands of the perpetrator and the world is his oyster, the purpose of this article and the “Buildings versus Blast” headline is to bring to the attention of those that have the responsibility for this sector of our security to be aware of the threat and begin a discussion of how they can participate in keeping the oyster shell tightly shut.

Targets

• Military and Government Establishments
• Embassies and Consulates
• Structures of Iconic Significance
• Transport, Power and Utility Facilities
• Commercial Office Facilities (Particularly international corporations and finance)
• Large Retail Areas (Particularly internationally know companies)
• Industrial Areas (Particularly internationally know companies)
• Health Care and Educational Facilities
• High Capacity Establishments that may display Behaviours Contrary to some Radical Groups

Figures published the US Department of State Patterns of Global Terrorism for 2002 show

*These figures represent 185 attacks of which 126 could have been bombings. That is one attack every 2.91 days and 2002 had a relatively low number of reported attacks, the lowest overall level of attacks certainly for the five previous years. Applying the same percentages to 2001 would result in 509 attacks of which 346 were bombings, almost one a day.

Planning

When planning any new building, it’s potential as a target should be assessed and as many protective systems, as are available and prudent, be part of the design and construction from it’s concept. Surveys of many kinds are required for any new structure, relevant to their intended use, size, position and exposure to the extremities of Mother Nature, as above. A structures potential as a target or its construction within an area containing existing or planned potential targets should be part of the original thinking and treated as an ordinary consideration as to positioning, design and construction. Additional costs incurred by dealing effectively with this threat should be able to set against reduced costs for security by designing the building to be easily secured and monitored and any insurance incentives that may be available.

In the “US Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Paper 427 - Primer for design of Commercial Buildings” it is stated that the best practices for explosive attack mitigation of properties are: 

• Place buildings as far from any secured perimeter as practical.
• Secure perimeter against vehicular intrusion using landscaping or barrier methods.
• Use lightweight non-structural elements on the buildings exterior and interior.
• Place unsecured areas exterior to the main structure or in the exterior bays
• Incorporate measures to resist progressive collapse
• Design exterior window systems and cladding so that the framing, connections and supporting structure have a lateral load resistance that is equal to or higher then the transparency or panel.
• Place air intakes as far above the ground level as practical.
• Physically isolate vulnerable areas such as the entries and delivery areas from the rest of the structure by using floor to floor walls in these areas.
• Use redundant, separated mechanical / electrical control systems.

Fort Knox Depository – Circa 1936 – 1,271 sqm. - Building and wall of granite, concrete and steel. To protect around 4,500 tonnes of gold.		The Forbidden Palace – Circa 1406 – 1420.-720,000 sqm. - Mainly wood, plaster and ceramics. To protect the Emperor Zhu Di and his Administration.

The decisions to be made as to the above criteria are based on several assessments:
 
Asset Value - Strategic / Financial / Iconic / Repute -     
A Very High Asset Value would be one where an explosive attack has the potential of a significant loss of life and injury to personnel and a loss of both primary and core functions for an unacceptable period. An attack on a Low Value Asset would have little or no risk to personnel and a loss of minor primary function and little effect on the core function for a short period of time. Evaluate not just the cost of repair/rebuild but loss of personnel, damage to reputation, business and continuity, also, consider what the attacker may be looking for in a target. If the asset is of high value, a small-scale attack might carry a worthwhile tariff to the attacker simply by breaching the security and receiving the publicity.

Threat - Vehicle / Suicide / Parcel Bomb / Placed and Left / External Launch –    
An attacker view the asset in terms of how best to achieve their end using an attack system they can acquire and use competently. This assessment should include acquiring intelligence on which groups may see the asset as a target and their historic modus operandi. Who would want to carry out an attack and why? The threat should be constantly re-assessed as the terrorist groups that may have an interest are not stable, they can transmute with breakaway sections having different agendas from the original group. Sections of the Irish Republican Army developed into the Provisional IRA and the Real IRA.

Vulnerability – An asset of high strategic value situated adjacent to a free car park with a shared goods delivery facility to the rear and underground staff / visitor park, is obviously highly vulnerable. A low strategic value asset situated 1000 yards along a private gated road will have a low vulnerability.

Risk – Putting the information from above together it is possible to assess the risk of an attack and identify the design, mitigation and security equipment and operational options available for the assets and it’s inhabitants well being.

Cost over Benefit – The last stage of the assessment is to compare the four headings within a “cost over benefit” framework to assess the cost of implementing specific systems with the benefits to the personnel, operation or business.

A system similar to the above should be used both in new build and renovation work. It would be advantageous to consider all forms of threat (fire, hurricane etc.) within the discussion as there may be some synergy in the applicable mitigation systems.

It is only a matter of time before somebody sues an organisation for not protecting their safety sufficiently through not using available systems that provide an enhance level of defence against terrorist attacks on soft targets. The design of any building that may fall into a target category should include such mitigation systems as a matter of course.
The “Buildings versus Blast” initiative is intended to start the discussion. 

BvB will be a programme of presentations planned to make those who hold the responsibility for the tasks above more aware of what has occurred in the past, it’s cost, understanding what can be achieved by improved site selection or design and the materials, systems and products available to assist in protecting the structures against this type of attack.

Programme Outline

Background